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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
Robin and Dexter Baptiste brought an action against the 
Bethlehem Landfill Company on behalf of a class of 
homeowner-occupants and renters claiming interference with 
the use and enjoyment of their homes and loss in property value 
caused by noxious odors and other air contaminants emanating 
from the Bethlehem landfill.  They brought these claims under 





The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania granted the company’s motion to dismiss the 
complaint.  The District Court held that too many residents 
were similarly affected to sustain a private claim for public 
nuisance, that the odors affected too many people and the 
landfill was too far away from them to constitute a private 
nuisance, and that the plaintiffs had failed to identify a duty of 
care to maintain a negligence claim.  We disagree, and 
therefore, we will reverse and remand.1 
 RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
A. Legal Framework 
Landfill operations in Pennsylvania are governed in part 
by the Commonwealth’s Solid Waste Management Act 
(SWMA).  The SWMA was enacted for several purposes 
including to “protect the public health, safety and welfare from 
the short and long term dangers of transportation, processing, 
treatment, storage, and disposal of all wastes,” and to “provide 
a flexible and effective means to implement and enforce the 
provisions of this act.”  35 P.S. § 6018.102(4)-(5).  The SWMA 
empowers the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection (PADEP or the “department”) to enforce the 
statute’s provisions.  35 P.S. § 6018.104(10)-(11); 35 P.S. 
§ 6018.103; 71 P.S. § 1340.501. 
 
1 The plaintiffs brought this class action pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  The District Court had 
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act.  28 U.S.C. 





One of the SMWA’s provisions states that “[a]ny 
violation of any provision of this act, any rule or regulation of 
the department, any order of the department, or any term or 
condition of any permit, shall constitute a public nuisance.”  35 
P.S. § 6018.601.  Among these rules and regulations is an 
obligation to implement a plan “to minimize and control public 
nuisances from odors,” 25 Pa. Code § 273.218(b)(1), and to be 
governed by a plan providing for “the orderly extension of 
municipal waste management systems . . . in a manner which 
will not . . . constitute a public nuisance.”  35 P.S. 
§ 6018.201(e)(1). 
The SWMA “does not provide for a private cause of 
action” and “private persons may only intervene under the 
SWMA in actions brought by [PADEP].”  Centolanza v. 
Lehigh Valley Dairies, Inc., 635 A.2d 143, 149 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1993), aff’d, 658 A.2d 336 (Pa. 1995).  Notwithstanding this 
limitation, the SWMA includes an express carve out or savings 
clause preserving private “rights of action or remedies” 
existing “under the common law or decisional law or in 
equity.”  35 P.S. § 6018.607. 
B. Plaintiffs’ Action 
The Baptistes are homeowners residing in 
Freemansburg, Pennsylvania, which is located on the west 
bank of the Lehigh River.  East of the river is Lower Saucon 
Township, where Bethlehem owns and operates a 224-acre 
solid waste disposal facility and landfill.  The landfill is 




waste decomposes, it releases “odorous landfill gas, leachate 
and other byproducts.”2  JA29 (Compl. ¶ 8). 
In 2018, the Baptistes sued Bethlehem for public 
nuisance, private nuisance, and negligence.  The plaintiffs 
asserted these claims on behalf of a putative class of other 
homeowner-occupants and renters in about 8,400 households 
within a 2.5-mile radius of the landfill, claiming property 
damages in excess of $5 million. 
According to the complaint, Bethlehem is not operating 
the landfill in accordance with the SWMA and industry 
standards, causing nearby neighborhoods, homes and yards to 
be “physically invaded by noxious odors, pollutants and air 
contaminants[.]”  JA29 (Compl. ¶ 12); see JA32 (Compl. ¶ 27) 
(alleging that Bethlehem “negligently failed to construct, 
maintain and/or operate the landfill, and caused the invasion of 
Plaintiffs’ property by noxious odors, air contaminants, and 
other airborne pollutants”). 
Over the years, residents have complained to PADEP 
and Lower Saucon Township about “odorous emissions” from 
the landfill.  JA30 (Compl. ¶ 13).  Bethlehem has received 
numerous fines and citations from PADEP and the township 
for its failure to properly manage and maintain the landfill, 
such as the “failure to implement a gas control and monitoring 
plan to effectively monitor gas collection for nuisance 
potential,” the failure to place covers atop the trash piles to 
“prevent vectors, odors, blowing litter, and other nuisances” 
 
2 Leachate is water that has been contaminated by 
soluble and often harmful residues or chemicals from the solid 




from escaping the landfill, and the “failure to implement the 
Nuisance Minimization and Control Plan to minimize and 
control conditions that are harmful to the environment or 
public health, or which create safety hazards, odors, dust, 
noise, unsightliness, and other public nuisances.”  JA30-31 
(Compl. ¶ 16 (d)-(f)). 
Some residents have contacted counsel to document 
their experiences with the landfill, describing “the sickening 
odors as obnoxious, foul, and nauseating.”  JA32 (Compl. 
¶ 20).  Residents complained that the odors prevent them from 
using and enjoying their homes and private land.  For instance, 
residents are unable to use their swimming pools, spend time 
on their porches, host guests (due to embarrassment), or play 
in their yards with their children or pets.  “At times, the stench 
becomes so pungent that it permeates the walls of [their] 
homes,” forcing them to keep “all windows and doors sealed 
shut and virtually render[ing] them entrapped in their own 
homes.”  JA32 (Compl. ¶ 22). 
On Bethlehem’s motion, the District Court dismissed 
the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Having dismissed all the 
claims, the court also dismissed the Baptistes’ request for 
punitive and injunctive relief.  The Baptistes timely appealed. 
C. Intervention by Amici 
We granted leave to the Public Interest Law Center and 
Philly Thrive to appear as amici in support of the Baptistes.  
These two non-profit organizations sought to shine light on the 
“environmental justice” implications of the District Court 




pollution—that is, low-income communities and communities 
of color.”3  Public Interest Law Center Amicus Br. 2. 
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America, the Pennsylvania Chamber of Business & Industry, 
the Pennsylvania Farm Bureau, and the National Waste & 
Recycling Association appeared as amici in support of 
Bethlehem.  In their view, the District Court decision preserves 
the business community’s ability to “coordinate” directly with 
regulatory agencies, rather than defend numerous private 
lawsuits, and redress large-scale environmental harms without 
reducing “investment and quality of goods and services.”  
Chamber of Commerce Amicus Br. 5, 24-31; see National 
Waste & Recycling Association Amicus Br. 1,16-19. 
 STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We exercise plenary review over the dismissal of a 
complaint under Federal Rule 12(b)(6).  Our role is to 
“determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  Phillips v. 
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  A complaint’s “well-
pleaded allegations” must be accepted as true and must be 
viewed “in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.”  
 
3 “Environmental justice embodies the principles that 
communities and populations should not be disproportionally 
exposed to adverse environmental impacts.”  PADEP, 
Environmental Justice, 
https://www.dep.pa.gov/PublicParticipation/OfficeofEnviron




McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citation omitted). 
 DISCUSSION 
The Baptistes assert that they have sufficiently pleaded 
the necessary elements for each of their causes of action: public 
nuisance, private nuisance, and negligence.  We will address 
the nuisance claims together, because the analysis overlaps in 
significant respects, before turning to negligence. 
Common-law nuisance is a notoriously perplexing and 
unruly doctrine, seeming to defy all efforts to draw bright lines 
around it.  See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 496 
n.17 (1987) (“There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in 
the entire law than that which surrounds the word ‘nuisance.’” 
(quoting W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 616 (5th ed. 1984)). 
The father of the leading treatise on torts, William 
Prosser, considered the law of nuisance a “legal garbage can” 
full of vagueness and uncertainty.  William L. Prosser, 
Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410 (1942).  
Courts have similarly struggled to find their footing on this 
legal quagmire.  As Justice Blackmun observed, “[O]ne 
searches in vain, I think, for anything resembling a principle in 
the common law of nuisance.”  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003, 1055 (1992) (dissenting). 
The Baptistes contend that the District Court 




result, imposed restrictions on their public and private nuisance 
claims that do not exist under Pennsylvania common law. 
Bethlehem disagrees.  It asserts that the District Court 
got it right, albeit for a slightly different reason.  Bethlehem 
argues that the Baptistes have not alleged an ordinary public or 
private nuisance, but rather a so-called “mass nuisance”—a 
large-scale industrial nuisance that is too large and widespread 
to be actionable by private persons.  Appellee’s Br. 28.  
According to Bethlehem, the state holds the exclusive power 
to remedy these sorts of nuisances. 
To clear out some of the debris from this cluttered area 
of the law, we begin with the basics.  Consistent with the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Pennsylvania law recognizes 
two types of nuisances: (i) public nuisance and (ii) private 
nuisance.  Youst v. Keck’s Food Serv., Inc., 94 A.3d 1057, 
1071-72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (citing Pa. Soc’y for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enters., Inc., 237 
A.2d 342, 348 (Pa. 1968) [“PSPCA”]); see RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A (1979); 2 SUMM. PA. JUR. 2D 
TORTS § 21:4 (2d ed.); see also Prosser, Nuisance Without 
Fault, supra at 411 (explaining that “[p]roperly used,” the term 
“‘nuisance,’ refers to two, and only two, types of invasions,” 
public nuisance and private nuisance, and noting that “[t]here 
is, properly, no other kind of nuisance”).  Thus, the Baptistes’ 
nuisance claims must rise or fall on these two theories. 
1. Public Nuisance 
A public nuisance is “an unreasonable interference with 
a right common to the general public,” such as the right to clean 
public water and fresh air in public spaces.  Philadelphia Elec. 




(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1)); 
Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 799 A.2d 751, 
773 (Pa. 2002).  Because these rights are held in common by 
the public at large and no one owns them to the exclusion of 
others, the remedy for their infringement ordinarily lies “in the 
hands of the state.”  Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 315 
(quoting William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public 
Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 999 (1966)). 
There is no dispute that the Baptistes have alleged the 
existence of a public nuisance based on Bethlehem’s alleged 
failure to operate its facility in accordance with the SWMA and 
the resulting discomfort and inconvenience caused by the 
offensive odors emanating from the landfill into their 
neighborhood.  See Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 773 (stating that 
an unreasonable interference with a public right may occur 
when “conduct involves a significant interference with . . . the 
public comfort or the public convenience,” or when “conduct 
is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative 
regulation” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 821B)).  The question is whether the Baptistes have properly 
pleaded a private claim for this public nuisance.  The answer is 
yes. 
When a public nuisance interferes with an individual’s 
personal rights, such as the right to use and enjoy “private 
land,” the aggrieved person has a private cause of action to 
remedy the infringement of his personal rights.  Philadelphia 
Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 315 (quoting Prosser, Private Action, 
supra, at 999); see 2 SUMM. PA. JUR. § 21:5 com. (“The harm 
suffered by the landowner is a particular harm differing in kind 
from that suffered by the general public, so the landowner can 
recover for the public nuisance.”).  To be actionable, the 




harm,” that is, “harm of importance involving more than slight 
inconvenience.”  Harford Penn-Cann Serv., Inc. v. Zymblosky, 
549 A.2d 208, 209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F com. c). 
Stated differently, to sustain a private claim on a public 
nuisance theory, “a plaintiff must have suffered a harm of 
greater magnitude and of a different kind than that which the 
general public suffered.”  Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 446 (3d Cir. 2000); see PSPCA, 
237 A.2d at 348 (“[A] public nuisance may be enjoined at the 
behest of a private citizen or group of citizens, if . . . their 
property or civil rights[] are specifically injured by the public 
nuisance over and above the injury suffered by the public 
generally.”). 
In Philadelphia Electric Co., we rejected a utility 
company’s attempt to recover costs related to cleaning up 
pollution in the Delaware River.  Although these pecuniary 
damages were different in kind from the harm suffered by the 
general public, there was no indication that the company had 
been “directly harmed in any way by the pollution in those 
waters.”  762 F.2d at 316.  But we observed that the company 
may have been able to assert a private claim if, “as a riparian 
landowner,” it “had suffered damage to its land or its 
operations as a result of the pollution of the Delaware.”  Id. 
(emphasis added); cf. Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 
F.3d 188, 189, 192, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the 
Clean Air Act did not preempt nuisance claims brought by 
Pennsylvania homeowners and residents for interference with 
use and enjoyment of their private land caused by the 
outmigration of noxious odors and particulates from a nearby 




Here, the Baptistes seek to vindicate their right to use 
and enjoy their home and obtain the full value of their 
property—personal rights that are qualitatively different (“of a 
different kind”) than the general, non-possessory right to clean 
air held in common with the community at large.  Philadelphia 
Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 316.  The alleged harm caused by the 
infringement of these personal rights is also quantifiably larger 
(“of greater magnitude”) than the harm caused by the 
interference with the general right to clean air.  Allegheny Gen. 
Hosp., 228 F.3d at 446.   
While everyone in the community—including visitors, 
commuters and residents alike—may suffer from the 
discomfort of having to breathe polluted air in public spaces, 
the Baptistes have identified cumulative harms that are unique 
to them and their fellow residents as homeowner-occupants or 
renters, such as the inability to use and enjoy their swimming 
pools, porches, and yards.  The complaint specifically alleges 
that the presence of these odors is “especially injurious” to 
class members “as compared with the public at large, given the 
impacts to their homes.”  JA32 (Compl. ¶ 28).  These injuries 
are above and beyond any injury to the public, because they 
involve private property damages that the public at large has 
not endured.  In short, the Baptistes sufficiently alleged a 
“particular damage” to sustain a private claim for public 
nuisance.  Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 316. 
The District Court’s contrary conclusion is not 
supported by Pennsylvania law.  The court reasoned that, 
because the presence of odors affected thousands of 
households in the same way, none of the residents could claim 
a “special harm.”  JA9.  The court relied primarily on a district 
court decision, quoting an isolated statement: “[W]here there 




suffered is not special.”  In re One Meridian Plaza Fire Litig., 
820 F. Supp. 1460, 1481 (E.D. Pa. 1993), vacated in part, No. 
CIV. A. 91-2171, 1993 WL 224167 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 1993), 
and rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Richard 
I. Rubin & Co., 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
There were two missteps in the District Court’s 
analysis. 
First, the District Court incorrectly conflated the 
putative class with the general public.  These two groups are 
not conterminous.  The Baptistes have asserted their claims 
specifically on behalf of a class of homeowner-occupants and 
renters, not the community at large.  Rather than compare the 
injuries suffered by the Baptistes with the same injuries 
suffered by similarly situated class members, the District Court 
should have compared the injuries suffered by putative class 
members as homeowner-occupants and renters with the harm 
shared by all community members including nonresidents such 
as visitors and commuters.  As explained above, that 
comparison reveals that the Baptistes have alleged additional 
invasions of their private property rights resulting from the 
interference with the common right to clean air. 
Second, the District Court’s reliance on One Meridian 
was misplaced.  There, a large fire engulfed a building in 
downtown Philadelphia, causing massive street closures.  
Local businesses brought a class action seeking compensation 
for lost profits and loss of access to their business properties 
under a public nuisance theory, among others.  One Meridian, 
820 F. Supp. at 1464, 1471.  While the One Meridian court 
speculated that allowing too many plaintiffs into the class 
might “generalize the harm,” it did not impose a numerical 




defined the class by the nature and degree of the harm suffered, 
that is, “lost profits” that were “reasonabl[y] certain[]” or “lack 
of access” that was “substantial.”  Id.; see 2 SUMM. PA. JUR. 
§ 21:5 illus. & n.4 (citing One Meridian for the proposition that 
“the only parties who may have suffered peculiar harm 
required for a public nuisance claim . . . were those businesses 
who could show with reasonable certainty that they lost profits 
due to the closure of the streets and who suffered substantial 
lack of access”).   
It also bears mentioning that One Meridian did not rely 
on Pennsylvania authority for the suggestion that real property 
damages (such as those alleged here) become “generalized” or 
“not special” if a large number of plaintiffs suffer the same 
injury.4  To our knowledge, no Pennsylvania court has so held, 
 
4 We note that the One Meridian court analyzed lack of 
access and lost profits together, as if they were 
indistinguishable.  They are not.  Lack of access is an invasion 
of a “property right in the land,” RESTATEMENT § 821C com. 
f, while lost profits are a form of pecuniary or economic losses 
that are not necessarily connected to invasions of real property, 
id. § 821C com. h.  That difference matters.  While we have 
found no Pennsylvania authority for limiting the number of 
plaintiffs that can recover for interference with real property 
rights on a nuisance theory, there is some authority for the 
proposition that businesses may lose their ability to recover lost 
profits on a public nuisance theory when all or the great 
majority of businesses in a community are similarly affected or 
when their economic losses are untethered from any real 
property damages.  See Duquesne Light Co. v. Pennsylvania 
Am. Water Co., 850 A.2d 701, 702, 707 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); 




either before or after One Meridian.  We believe that the 
District Court erred in taking that step first. 
In brief, the Baptistes have properly stated a private 
claim for public nuisance. 
2. Private Nuisance 
The Baptistes have also stated a private nuisance claim.  
A private nuisance exists when a person’s conduct invades 
“another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land,” 
and that invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or 
unintentional but negligent.  Youst, 94 A.3d at 1072 (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822).  There is no dispute 
that the Baptistes have sufficiently pleaded these elements. 
Still, the District Court dismissed the private nuisance 
claim, adopting a similar logic as it did for public nuisance.  
The court reasoned that, because the outmigration of odors was 
a public nuisance insofar as it affected the “whole community” 
rather than only “some particular person,” it could not also be 
a private nuisance.  JA13 (quoting Phillips v. Donaldson, 112 
A. 236, 246 (Pa. 1920)).  That was legal error. 
Although public and private nuisance are distinct causes 
of action, they are not mutually exclusive.  Again, the critical 
difference between these two theories of liability is not the 
number of persons harmed but the nature of the right affected: 
 
not address that distinction any further, because it is not 
relevant here.  The Baptistes are not seeking economic losses, 
only real property damages, i.e., loss of real property value and 





a public nuisance requires interference with common or public 
rights, while a private nuisance requires only interference with 
personal or private rights.5  See Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 
F.2d at 315; Youst, 94 A.3d at 1071; see 58 AM. JUR. 2D 
NUISANCES §§ 25, 32 (2020).   
When a private or public nuisance is so widespread that 
it affects both public and private rights, it may be actionable as 
either public or private “or both public and private.”  Youst, 94 
A.3d at 1071 (citing PSPCA, 237 A.2d at 348).  There may be 
some overlap between these two causes of action, for instance 
when, as here, the alleged interference with private land 
supplies the basis for both the private nuisance claim and the 
particular harm required to sustain a private claim for public 
nuisance.  See, e.g., Umphred v. VP Auto Sales & Salvage, Inc., 
No. 1372 MDA 2014, 2015 WL 6965725, at *12 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. June 24, 2015) (affirming the lower court’s conclusion that 
“noise pollution” from the operation of a scrap metal recycling 
facility was actionable by nearby residents both as a public and 
private nuisance, because it interfered with both public and 
private rights);6 see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 821C com. e, 821B com. h. 
 
5 Phillips is not to the contrary.  It is clear from the 
context of that case that the distinction the court draws between 
public and private nuisance focuses on differentiating between 
whether the nuisance affects the rights of the “general public” 
or the rights of a “private individual.”  112 A. at 238. 
6 We cite Umphred for illustrative purposes only, as we 
are cognizant that the Pennsylvania Superior Court has limited 
the precedential weight of any “unpublished memorandum 




The District Court further held that private nuisance 
claims are only available to resolve conflicts between 
proximate or adjoining neighbors.  The court found that the 
Baptistes’ home, which is located about 1.6 miles from the 
landfill, was too far to qualify as a “neighboring property.”  
A13.  That, too, was legal error. 
We have found no support under Pennsylvania law for 
rejecting a private nuisance claim on the ground that the 
property affected was too far from the source of the alleged 
nuisance.  Bethlehem points to a decision from more than a 
century ago in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted 
“the proximity” of the property to the source of the nuisance, 
Gavigan v. Atl. Ref. Co., 40 A. 834, 835 (Pa. 1898), but that 
case did not hold that a more distant property would not have 
been able to bring the same claim.  Nor have we seen any case 
citing Gavigan for that proposition in the 120 years since it was 
decided.   
Conversely, the last reported case to cite Gavigan 
recognized the existence of a private nuisance even though the 
source of the alleged nuisance—manufacturing plants emitting 
“corrosive gases, smoke, lead particles and lead oxides”—was 
located about “one and one-half miles” from the plaintiffs’ 
property.  Noerr v. Lewistown Smelting & Ref., Inc., 60 Pa. D. 
& C.2d 406, 408, 414 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1973).  More recently, in 
a nuisance action brought against another landfill, a 
Pennsylvania court rejected this supposed “neighboring 




No. 2018 CV 1159, slip op. at 6 (Pa. Com. Pl. Jan. 24, 2019) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).7 
In sum, because the Baptistes have alleged that their 
private property rights are being significantly and 
unreasonably infringed by the presence of noxious odors and 
air contaminants released by the Bethlehem landfill, they have 
stated both a private claim for public nuisance and a private 
nuisance claim. 
3. “Mass Nuisance” 
We conclude our nuisance analysis by addressing 
Bethlehem’s “mass nuisance” theory.  Bethlehem contends 
that when too many people complain of the same particular 
harm, they lose the right to bring a private action to remedy 
that injury.  Bethlehem does not identify a precise number at 
which that right is extinguished.  It argues that this threshold is 
crossed when the nuisance is so widespread that the number of 
aggrieved persons becomes “indeterminate” or when it affects 
 
7 The other cases cited by the District Court and 
Bethlehem are inapposite.  They focus on “neighboring or 
adjoining” properties for different reasons: (i) nuisance 
requires “contemporaneous” or simultaneous uses of land by 
the plaintiff and the defendant and (ii) a plaintiff cannot assert 
a nuisance claim against a defendant when “the nuisance 
property and the affected property are one and the same.”  
Rowe v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 262 F.R.D. 451, 459-
60 (D.N.J. 2009); see also Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 
314-15; Cavanagh v. Electrolux Home Prod, 904 F. Supp. 2d 





an entire neighborhood, as opposed to only a small subset of 
its population, regardless of its size. 
In other words, if the Baptistes and only a few other 
households were affected by the odors, they would have 
cognizable nuisance claims.  But because the odors reach the 
whole neighborhood (some 20,000 residents by Bethlehem’s 
count), none of the residents may bring a private claim to 
redress infringements of the same personal rights.  Instead, 
according to Bethlehem, they must depend entirely on PADEP 
or other public officials to remedy the situation on their behalf. 
Bethlehem insists that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
endorsed this theory more than a century ago in Gavigan and 
then again in Edmunds v. Duff, 124 A. 489 (Pa. 1924), a case 
that Bethlehem belatedly cited for the first time at oral 
argument.  But neither of these cases supports Bethlehem’s 
position.  Edmunds actually undermines it.  There, the court 
held that individual residents retained the right in equity to 
protect themselves against any “interference with the 
enjoyment of private homes” caused by “the operation of a 
business or industry tending to render the immediate 
community a less desirable place in which to live,” even 
though “the resulting injury . . . necessarily affects practically 
all persons who happen to be living in the immediate 
neighborhood[.]”  Edmunds, 124 A. at 492.  The Edmunds 
court alluded to “numerous cases” illustrating this point and 
noted that residents that were “especially injured” in those 
cases were “invariably” entitled to relief on an individual basis, 
“regardless of the fact that the acts complained of may also 
have amounted to a public nuisance and liable to be dealt with 




To be sure, neither party has submitted a decision of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court directly addressing the question 
of whether there is a limit on the number of plaintiffs that can 
recover private property damages on a nuisance theory.8  “In 
the absence of a controlling decision by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, a federal court applying that state’s substantive 
law must predict how Pennsylvania’s highest court would 
decide this case.  In predicting how the highest court of the 
state would resolve the issue, [we] must consider ‘relevant 
state precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, 
scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending 
convincingly to show how the highest court in the state would 
decide the issue at hand.’”  Berrier v. Simplicity Mfg., Inc., 563 
F.3d 38, 45-46 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted) 
(footnotes omitted) (alteration supplied). 
We are not convinced that Pennsylvania’s highest court 
would adopt Bethlehem’s novel position in this case.  In 
addition to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases and other 
authorities establishing the controlling legal principles 
referenced in our nuisance analysis above, there are several 
examples of state or federal courts allowing private nuisance 
actions by large numbers of homeowners and residents for 
widespread industrial nuisances in Pennsylvania, including an 
almost identical class action recently filed against another 
landfill in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County.  
See Leety, No. 2018 CV 1159, slip op. at 1; see also, e.g., Diehl 
v. CSX Transp., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 3d 487, 494-95, 507-08 
(W.D. Pa. 2018) (denying a motion to dismiss a private 
nuisance claim brought by a putative class of “approximately 
 
8 The parties agree that this question does not warrant 




1,000” residents); Maroz v. Arcelormittal Monessen LLC, No. 
15-cv-0770, 2015 WL 6070172, at *2, *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 
2015) (denying a motion to dismiss private nuisance claims 
against a metal processing plant emitting “noxious odors and 
air particulates,” brought by an unspecified number of 
“surrounding residents”). 
Bethlehem cites other Pennsylvania cases that it claims 
support its position.  Yet none of those cases imposed a limit 
on the number of plaintiffs who can recover for the 
unwarranted invasions of their private property rights.  For 
instance, Bethlehem cites at length Brunner v. Schaffer, 1 Pa. 
D. 646 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1892), for the proposition that “widely-
dispersed airborne emissions across an entire neighborhood is 
a claim for public nuisance without ‘special injury,’ and is 
redressable solely by public authorities like PADEP.”  
Appellee’s Br. 23.  Yet Brunner says no such thing.   
The Brunner court itself acknowledged that the right of 
action for public or private nuisance “depends upon the 
character of the injury solely,” not “the number of people who 
suffer by it.”  1 Pa. D. at 648.  True, the court rejected a private 
nuisance claim for foul odors that were “entering into the open 
windows of the plaintiff’s house,” but it did so because the 
plaintiff had not specifically alleged a “special injury” to 
property or persons distinct from the general discomfort 
suffered “by all the others in that locality.”  Id. at 649.  There 
was no indication that the plaintiff had complained of any 
interference with the use and enjoyment of her home, nor of 
any “property destroyed or depreciated.”  Id. 
Nor do we see any indication that cases from other 
jurisdictions —to the extent that they support Bethlehem’s 




58 AM. JUR. 2D NUISANCES § 37 (noting that some courts have 
stated that a private nuisance is limited to a “relatively few 
persons” or a “determinate number of persons,” but citing only 
a handful of out-of-state cases). 
All that Bethlehem is left with are policy arguments.  
Bethlehem believes that leaving the remediation of large-scale 
industrial nuisances to the exclusive discretion of 
democratically accountable public officers is a sensible rule, 
because subjecting public utilities such as landfills to liability 
for private damages at the behest of thousands or millions of 
individuals would pose an “existential threat” to critical 
services that benefit the whole community.  Oral Arg. Audio 
24:55-25:00, 29:10-15.  Their supporting amici also warn 
against allowing “piecemeal” litigation “to attack landfill 
operations” that are already subject to “intense regulatory 
scrutiny,” because it could undermine the “consistent 
application” of the regulatory regime.  National Waste & 
Recycling Association Amicus Br. 17, 19-20; see Chamber of 
Commerce Amicus Br. 28-29. 
The Baptistes beg to differ.  They counter that the right 
to bring a private cause of action is a longstanding and 
important legal tool for protecting private property rights 
against the incursion of industrial nuisances.  They note that, 
by including a savings clause in the SWMA, the Pennsylvania 
legislature expressly preserved the right to bring private 
actions under the common law to redress infringements of 
personal rights in addition to any other remedies that may be 
available through public action under that statute.  See 35 P.S. 
§ 6018.607 (“It is hereby declared to be the purposes of [the 
SWMA] to provide additional and cumulative remedies[.]” 
(emphasis added)); Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413, 




rights of private citizens in mind when it drafted the [SWMA] 
but elected to protect those rights by way of existing common 
law remedies, such as actions for negligence and nuisance.”). 
Their supporting amici emphasize that this private right 
is of greater importance to historically underrepresented 
communities whose interests are not always fully addressed by 
public agencies or through the political process.  For instance, 
recent studies have shown that environmental pollution, 
including from landfills, has a disparate impact on racial-ethnic 
minorities and low-income communities.  See, e.g., 
Christopher W. Tessum et al., Inequity in Consumption of 
Goods and Services Adds to Racial-Ethnic Disparities in Air 
Pollution Exposure, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6001, 6001 
(2019) (finding that “non-Hispanic whites experience . . . 
∼17% less air pollution exposure than is caused by their 
consumption,” while “Blacks and Hispanics on average bear a 
‘pollution burden’ of 56% and 63% excess exposure, 
respectively, relative to the exposure caused by their 
consumption”); Kathy Seward Northern, Battery and Beyond: 
A Tort Law Response to Environmental Racism, 21 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 498-505 (1997) 
(reviewing empirical research indicating that landfills and 
other waste disposal facilities are significantly more likely to 
be built in minority and low-income communities).   
Yet environmental laws remain underenforced in those 
communities.  See, e.g., R. Shea Diaz, Getting to the Root of 
Environmental Injustice: Evaluating Claims, Causes, and 
Solutions, 29 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 767, 779 (2017) (reviewing 




“enforcement is less vigilant in minority and low-income 
communities”).9 
Notwithstanding these important policy concerns, we 
remain tethered to what Pennsylvania law requires.  We have 
not been presented with any Pennsylvania authority for the 
proposition that an individual’s right to recover private 
property damages on a nuisance theory turns on the size of the 
nuisance or the number of persons harmed, as opposed to the 
nature of the rights affected or the degree of the harm suffered.  
And we see no reason to depart from longstanding principles 
that allow individuals to recover private property damages 
caused by widespread nuisances, especially where, as here, the 
number of plaintiffs is not so large as to be “indeterminate,” as 
 
9 PADEP has also recognized that “minority and low-
income Pennsylvanians have been forced to bear a 
disproportionate share of adverse environmental 
impacts.”  PADEP, Environmental Justice, 
https://www.dep.pa.gov/PublicParticipation/OfficeofEnviron
mentalJustice/Pages/default.aspx (last seen July 13, 2020).  In 
fact, PADEP has identified Freemansburg, where the Baptistes 
reside, as an “environmental justice area,” meaning an area 
“where 20 percent or more individuals live in poverty, and/or 
30 percent or more of the population is minority.”  
See PADEP, PA Environmental Justice Areas, 
https://www.dep.pa.gov/PublicParticipation/OfficeofEnviron
mentalJustice/Pages/PA-Environmental-Justice-
Areas.aspx (last seen July 13, 2020); 
PADEP, Environmental Justice Areas of Pennsylvania, 
http://files.dep.state.pa.us/PublicParticipation/Office%20of%
20Environmental%20Advocacy/EnvAdvocacyPortalFiles/En




Bethlehem posits, but rather is defined and limited to 
homeowner-occupants and renters within a 2.5-mile radius 
from the landfill.   
To adopt Bethlehem’s novel position would produce the 
anomalous result of penalizing small polluters while 
exempting larger polluters from the same liability.  We decline 
to take that step without a clear directive from the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court. 
We now turn to the negligence claim.  In Pennsylvania, 
a plaintiff complaining of negligence must establish that (i) the 
defendant has a legal duty to conform to a certain standard of 
care to prevent unreasonable risks to the plaintiff, (ii) the 
defendant’s conduct breached that duty, (iii) the breach caused 
an injury to the plaintiff, and (iv) the injury resulted in actual 
losses or damages.  Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Babayan, 430 
F.3d 121, 139 (3d Cir. 2005); R.W. v. Manzek, 888 A.2d 740, 
746 (Pa. 2005). 
The parties’ arguments on negligence have evolved 
throughout the litigation.  In the District Court, Bethlehem 
sought dismissal of the negligence claim on the ground that the 
Baptistes had failed to identify a legal duty to prevent the 
outmigration of odors or other nuisance conditions.   
In response, the Baptistes initially argued that the 
relevant duty was found in Bethlehem’s obligation to comply 
with certain requirements under the SWMA and that any 
violation of those statutory provisions constituted a breach of 
that duty.  At the hearing before the District Court, the 




SWMA did not create a legal duty owed to private individuals, 
the Baptistes invoked a common-law duty of care arising from 
Bethlehem’s “affirmative act” of operating a landfill.  JA74; 
see JA38 (Compl. ¶ 63) (alleging that Bethlehem breached its 
“duty to exercise ordinary care and diligence when it 
improperly constructed, maintained and/or operated the 
landfill”). 
The District Court ignored this common-law argument, 
treated the Baptistes’ statute-based argument as a claim of 
negligence per se, and held that negligence per se was not 
actionable under the SWMA. 
On appeal, the Baptistes assert that the District Court 
erred not because it rejected a negligence per se claim but 
because it did not recognize the existence of a common-law 
duty.  According to the Baptistes, “Pennsylvania courts have 
long recognized” that when a person undertakes “affirmative, 
risk-causing conduct,” such as operating a landfill, that person 
assumes a common-law duty to protect others “against an 
unreasonable risk of harm arising out of that act.”  Appellants’ 
Br. 28-29, 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Bethlehem modified its argument accordingly.  On 
appeal, Bethlehem concedes that it owes the plaintiffs a 
common-law duty to undertake its landfilling operations with 
reasonable care but disputes the content of that duty.  
According to Bethlehem, “the duty is to protect others against 
an unreasonable risk of harm,” and it argues that, “in this 
context, ‘harm’ means physical harm, not mere nuisance” such 
as odors.10  Appellee’s Br. 34-35.  Bethlehem contends for the 
 
10 Bethlehem cites Gilbert v. Synagro Cent., LLC, 90 




first time that, because the Baptistes have not pleaded any 
physical injury to persons or property, they have failed to state 
an independent claim for negligence. 
That argument is drastically different from the issue 
presented to and addressed by the District Court.  As the parties 
stand before us, there is no longer any dispute that Bethlehem 
has a common-law duty to operate the landfill in a manner that 
avoids any unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiffs.11  On 
 
954 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), to suggest that the Baptistes cannot 
rely on the same nuisance conditions to state a separate 
negligence claim.  Not so.  The key difference between Gilbert 
and Horne on the one hand and this case on the other is the 
allegation of wrongful conduct (i.e., breach of a legal duty), 
which was not at issue in Gilbert or Horne.  See Gilbert, 90 
A.3d at 51 (“As in Horne, the operative facts here establish that 
the Residents have asserted nuisance claims, not negligence 
claims—namely claims based upon a use of property that ‘is 
not wrongful in itself, but only in the consequences which may 
flow from it.’” (citing Kramer v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 19 A.2d 
362, 363 (Pa. 1941) (emphasis added)). 
11 Indeed, in Pennsylvania, a duty of reasonable care 
attaches to persons undertaking affirmative, risk-causing acts.  
Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1046-47 (Pa. 2018).  That 
includes the operation of industrial sites.  See, e.g., Leety, No. 
2018-cv-1159, slip op. at *7 (holding that plaintiffs had 
sufficiently alleged that a landfill operator owed surrounding 
property owners a “duty to exercise ordinary care and 
diligence” based on “[i]ndustry standards of care”); Noerr, 60 
Pa. D. & C.2d at 453 (finding that the failure to install and 
properly operate adequate pollution controls was negligent).  




that basis alone, we will reverse the District Court’s dismissal 
of the negligence claim. 
Still, the question remains whether the Baptistes have 
sufficiently pleaded a cognizable injury to state an independent 
negligence claim.  See LaForm v. Bethlehem Twp., 499 A.2d 
1373, 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §§ 371, 497.  The Baptistes believe they have 
sufficiently pleaded physical property damages insofar as they 
alleged that “noxious odors, pollutants and air contaminants” 
have “physically” invaded their property, JA29 (Compl. ¶ 12), 
constituting a “hazard to health, safety, or property.”  JA30-31 
(Compl. ¶ 16).  At oral argument, the Baptistes noted that they 
also alleged the outmigration of “landfill gas,” which they 
claim is composed primarily of “hydrogen sulfide,” an odorous 
chemical that can be hazardous to human health after repeated 
exposure.  Oral Arg. Audio 41:35-55.  
We will not venture into the weeds of this issue in the 
first instance.  See Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 
272-73 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Our Circuit adheres to a well 
established principle that it is inappropriate for an appellate 
court to consider a contention raised on appeal that was not 
initially presented to the district court.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  However, because the parties have not 
argued forfeiture or waiver of these new arguments, we will 
leave it to the District Court to determine whether to consider 
 
identify the relevant standard of care and considered “evidence 
of the violation of the SWMA as evidence of negligence.”  
Hartle v. FirstEnergy Generation Corp., No. CIV.A. 08-1019, 




the question of physical injury on remand either before or at 
the summary judgment stage.12 
 CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the District Court 
decision and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
12 Conceptually, it is not difficult to conceive how the 
presence of hazardous particulates in the air could constitute 
physical property damage if these pollutants infiltrate physical 
structures, as is the case when hazardous chemicals seep into 
private wells through contamination in groundwater.  See 
Ayers v. Jackson Twp., 525 A.2d 287, 294 (N.J. 1987); see also 
Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., No. CIV.A. 06-1743, 2008 WL 
2977867, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2008) (“[T]he physical 
presence of vinyl chloride [a hazardous substance] in the air, 
even if undetectable, constitutes a physical injury to the 
property for purposes of common law property damage 
claims.”).  Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
Baptistes, as required at the pleadings stage, the allegations in 
the complaint—namely that “landfill gas” and other hazardous 
contaminants have physically invaded the plaintiffs’ property 
and “permeate[d] the walls”—may be enough to satisfy that 
requirement. 
